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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the 2018 measles outbreaks that occurred in Colombia and Brazil
as a result of importation from Venezuela, seeking to uncover underlying factors contributing to
significantly greater case numbers in Brazil than in Colombia. It analyzes vaccination coverage,
migrant integration, and migration policy, using a mixed-methods approach to compare the two
countries. Qualitative analysis of the border zones, migration policies, health systems, and
progression of the outbreaks in each country reveals that geographical and socioeconomic
differences at the borders, heterogeneity of vaccination coverage, timeliness of policy responses,
and disease tracing capabilities could all be possible contributors to greater disease burden in
Brazil. Quantitative analysis using public opinion surveys finds differences in attitudes towards
Venezuelan migrants and access to health services that may have contributed to the experiences
of the Venezuelan population of each country and led to greater disease spread in Brazil. As a
whole, this thesis aims to demonstrate the multi-faceted nature of cross-border disease
transmission and the varied methods that may be used to combat disease spread resulting from
migration crises.
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Chapter One: The Border Health Crisis
Measles in Colombia and Brazil: Why it Matters
The resurgence of measles in Colombia and Brazil is closely related to the recent and
ongoing Venezuelan crisis. Hyperinflation, corruption, food shortages and a lack of medications,
along with other factors, have driven large numbers of Venezuelans from their home country.
Many Venezuelan migrants come from areas with health care infrastructure in disarray, leaving
them in poor health when they enter their countries of destination. This results in transmission of
diseases between countries in the region and the creation of major public health concerns that
extend far beyond Venezuela’s borders.
In 2016, after a 22 year-long effort, measles was declared eliminated in the region of the
Americas (PAHO/WHO, 2016). However, beginning in 2017, measles cases burgeoned;
Venezuela reported 727 measles cases in 2017, then 5,667 in 2018 (WHO, 2021). A subsequent
resurgence of measles was seen in both Colombia and Brazil in 2018. The cause of resurgence is
largely attributed to transmission from Venezuelan migrants; genotype D8, of identical viral
lineage to the cases reported in Venezuela, was identified in both Colombia and Brazil (PAHO,
2018). As an estimated 1.2 million Venezuelan migrants had entered Colombia by 2018, while
an estimated 151,000 had entered Brazil, it could be logically expected that measles cases in
Colombia would outnumber measles cases in Brazil; nevertheless, Brazil reported 10,326
measles cases in 2018, while Colombia reported only 208 (UNHCR, 2021; WHO, 2020). Figure
1 below shows the trends in Venezuelan migration and measles cases in Colombia and Brazil
from 2017-2019 – note the differences in scale.
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Figure 1
Venezuelan migrants and measles cases in Colombia and Brazil, 2017-2019

Sources: UNHCR. (2021). Refugee Data Finder. In United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNHCR.
https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/download/?url=HL1f82. WHO. (2020). WHO Vaccine-preventable Diseases:
Monitoring System. In World Health Organization. https://apps.who.int/immunization_monitoring/globalsummary

This paradox brings forward a number of questions: what factors allowed Colombia to
have greater success in controlling measles outbreaks? Additionally, what can we learn from the
comparison of these two countries in measles control in order to inform future cross-border
disease control efforts?
The above questions are worth answering for a multitude of reasons, particularly because
the relevance of the spread of disease extends beyond individual countries, regions, and
continents. We live in a globalized world that generally shies away from isolation – we
incessantly interact, collaborate, and travel across borders. With all of the benefits that come
from this cooperation also come the downfalls of spreading communicable disease. Breakdowns
in the health care and vaccination capabilities of one country can result in the rapid rise of health
problems throughout an entire region if the neighboring countries are not equipped to handle
disease control and prevention. Studying the successes and failures of Colombia and Brazil in
controlling measles importation, as well as the contributing factors, may reveal strategies that
could be applied in other countries throughout the world to lessen the threat of large-scale
disease outbreaks in the future.
Case Selection
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I elected to study measles importation specifically for three reasons. First, measles was
declared eliminated throughout the Region of the Americas (spanning from North America to
South America, including the Caribbean) only a year before the disease began recirculating
throughout Venezuela, and only two years before it spread to other countries in South America.
This provides a unique opportunity to study measles control methods in elimination settings –
what went wrong to allow this disease to almost immediately resurge after decades were spent on
achieving elimination? Second, it is a well-studied vaccine-preventable disease. Theoretically, as
long as a population has a vaccination rate of at least 95%, outbreaks should not occur. The
resurgence of measles in Venezuela and the subsequent outbreaks that followed throughout the
region demonstrate, however, that distribution of vaccinations and targeting of at-risk
populations is of great importance in meeting that 95% threshold throughout a country. The final
reason for the selection of measles for this study is the pathology of the virus itself. Measles is
highly contagious, which makes the disease easily spread throughout susceptible populations.
Additionally, contracting the measles virus can cause seemingly non-measles related health
complications long after the initial infection period has subsided. This means that the
reestablishment of measles within a population can cause long term impacts, from increased
health care costs, burdens on health systems, and increased childhood and infant mortality rates.
The pathology of measles virus will be addressed and explained further in Chapter Two.
In terms of country selection, I elected to study Colombia and Brazil primarily based on
their geography. They both share borders with Venezuela, which means that Venezuelan
migrants entering each country through land crossing points are coming directly from Venezuela,
not through any intermediary country. This allows for the assumption that outbreaks with
identical lineage to the virus circulating from Venezuela did in fact occur as a result of
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importation directly from Venezuela. Additionally, the selection of Colombia and Brazil for
study allows for the comparison of two countries that faced similar circumstances (i.e. achieved
measles elimination in 2016 and saw a resurgence of measles in early 2018), but that had
different outcomes resulting from measles importation.
Methodological Overview & Limitations
The purpose of this project is to uncover the underlying differences between Colombia
and Brazil that may have contributed to successes and/or failures in cross-border disease control.
It is a comparative, mixed-methods study. Rather than approach this question from a strictly
epidemiological perspective, I widen the scope of the project to include underlying political,
economic, social, and institutional differences.
After providing background information and a theoretical framework for the study in
Chapter Two, qualitative analysis begins in Chapter Three. It begins with a comparison of border
relations and relevance, then moves to a discussion of migration policy and programs aimed at
discerning differences in approach and execution. Next is a comparison of the health systems in
each country, investigating accessibility to health services for both citizens and non-citizens of
each country. Finally, the chapter concludes with a comparison of the course of the outbreaks as
well as a comparison of the demographic makeup of the Venezuelan population of each country.
This section contributes to an understanding of the epidemiological aspect: it analyzes what
happened during the outbreaks and which groups were most affected. The bulk of the analysis
relies upon reports published by government agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and multilateral agencies.
Through qualitative analysis, I find that heterogeneous vaccination coverage in Brazil
may have played a large role in some of the differences in measles spread. I also find that the
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proactive and timely responses of the Colombian government, as well as thorough disease
tracing and surveillance capacity, could have been factors allowing for greater success in measles
control. Lastly, I demonstrate that the high concentration of Venezuelan migrants in northern
Brazil likely contributed greatly to the differences in impact of measles importation between the
two countries.
Quantitative analysis is conducted in Chapter Four, utilizing survey data collected by the
Latin American Public Opinions Project (LAPOP). In this chapter, public opinion towards
Venezuelan migrants and access to social services for native and non-native populations is
analyzed in order to discern factors that contribute to differing opinions in each country. I
compare survey responses in each country as a whole to survey responses in areas most affected
by measles outbreaks, which allows for analysis of differing responses both within and between
countries. Additionally, crosstabulation is performed using the survey data in order to discern
specific factors that may impact public sentiment.
I find that in Colombia, the areas of the country most impacted by measles outbreaks
tended to be more welcoming of the Venezuelan population when compared to the country as a
whole. In Brazil, I found the opposite to be true. In addition, the areas most affected by measles
outbreaks in Colombia perceived better access to government provided social services than did
the country as a whole, while the opposite trend was observed in Brazil.
As a whole, this thesis highlights the importance of sustainability in disease elimination
strategies. The breakdown of vaccine distribution and health infrastructure in Venezuela resulted
in the spread of measles across borders, making it a renewed problem in countries throughout the
Americas. Furthermore, it demonstrates that the health and ill-health of populations is almost
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always deeply embedded in larger political, economic, and social frameworks, especially in the
case of humanitarian crises.
Limitations
The mixed-methods design of this study allows for in-depth investigation of factors
contributing to the impact of disease importation that cannot necessarily be quantified, which
introduces certain limitations. Data availability is a notable limitation of this study. Although a
wealth of reports and publications about the Venezuelan crisis and its effects on Colombia and
Brazil exist, many do not provide statistical information that is collected the same way or within
the same time period in both countries, making comparison through quantitative analysis
methods difficult to accomplish with accuracy. It is for this reason that I elected to qualitatively,
rather than quantitatively, compare aspects like border relations, migration policy and health
systems, along with the course of the outbreaks and migrant demographics. I later employ
quantitative analysis using the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey data from Colombia and
Brazil. These surveys provide an opportunity to make statistical comparisons, as the survey is
standardized across countries and collected along similar time frames.
An additional limitation to the study as a whole is the differing border situations of
Colombia and Brazil. As will be further described in Chapter Three, Colombia has many formal
entry points throughout seven states along its border with Venezuela, while Brazil has only one
into the state of Roraima. This results in disproportionate pressure being put onto the state of
Roraima to accommodate the entry of Venezuelan migrants when compared to the 5 states
accommodating the entry of migrants into Colombia. This provides an additional reason to
address this question from a qualitative, comparative standpoint. It is important to acknowledge
that much of the cause of the disproportionate impact of disease importation into each country
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could be accountable to this notable difference between the countries – statistical comparisons at
the national level would be inaccurate and could lead to the mischaracterization of the actual
situation along the border zones.
The use of reports published by governmental agencies, NGOs, and multilateral agencies
prevents precise comparisons from being made in some situations, as equivalent information is
not always made available for each country. There is also potential for bias on behalf of the
publishing entities. These actors may have vested interests in presenting the Venezuelan crisis
and subsequent humanitarian crises in Colombia and Brazil in a way that would be to their
individual benefit. This sort of bias is rather unavoidable, as I must work with the statistics and
metrics that are made available. However, I hope that by using information published by a
combination of varied organizations, I will mitigate some distortions that may be present within
each individual source.
Furthermore, the use of the LAPOP survey results presents its own limitations. The study
relies upon responses being representative of the overall sentiments in the area investigated.
Additionally, it is limited by the questionnaire. The survey included few questions related to
health and migration specifically, preventing comprehensive analysis of interconnected factors.
If I were able to conduct my own survey for this study, I would include more questions
directed toward access to vaccinations and availability of health services, as well as questions
relating to specific factors that prevent individuals from accessing health services. Moreover, I
would include Venezuelan migrants in each country in the survey and incorporate questions
about instances of discrimination within the community, specifically in government offices and
health facilities. This would allow for a better understanding of public opinion for both groups,
rather than solely the opinions of the receiving population.
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Chapter Two: Background & Framework
Background
The Venezuelan Crisis
Venezuela is currently facing an economic collapse resulting in one of the most extreme
migrant crises in recent history. The effects of instability and poor economic conditions on the
Venezuelan population have been drastic. The country faces unprecedented hyperinflation and
extreme shortages of food, medical supplies, and other basic necessities (Tuite et al., 2018). The
Venezuelan government initially failed to recognize the extent of the crisis or implement
effective strategies to alleviate it, even blocking international aid and assistance. They instead
focused on creating a narrative claiming that foreign powers and the political opposition were
waging an “economic war” meant to destabilize Venezuela. These claims are unsubstantiated, as
drops in oil prices, in combination with the government’s own policies, are cited by analysts as
the main contributors to the economic collapse. This did not stop the use of intimidation tactics
to quell dissent and criticism. Doctors, nurses, and other health care providers are threatened
with the loss of their jobs for speaking out on the shortages of drugs and medical supplies. Those
who participate in protests and demonstrations risk beatings, arrest, and prosecution in military
courts. Essentially, health care in Venezuela was politicized to the point that noncompliance, or
even open disagreement, with the government significantly lessened the already poor chances
one had at receiving or providing sufficient medical care or treatment (HRW, 2016).
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Based on the state of health care in Venezuela, it is unsurprising that many previously
eradicated or well-controlled infectious diseases have made a comeback in recent years.
Numerous forces have combined to create the perfect environment for such a syndemic, most
notably shortages of adequate nutrition and medical supplies, low access to healthcare and
vaccinations, and interruptions of immunization programs (Rodríguez-Morales et al., 2019). A
survey conducted in 2016 revealed that 76% of public hospitals in Venezuela lacked the basic
medications and medical supplies necessary for the proper functioning of a health care facility.
Unsanitary conditions due to lack of cleaning and sanitation supplies contributed to spread of
infections between patients. Doctors resort to asking patients to purchase their own medicines
and supplies to bring with them to the hospital, but they are difficult to obtain even from private
pharmacies. This prevents medical providers from performing even the most basic procedures,
and leaves patients with chronic conditions unable to obtain life-sustaining medications (HRW,
2016).
Due to the corruption and lack of transparency of the Venezuelan government, it is
difficult to determine the true extent of the situation. Data reporting by the Venezuelan Health
Ministry over recent years demonstrates how this has impacted the public health sector. In July
of 2015, the Venezuelan Health Ministry stopped releasing data; two years later, a publication
released by the Health Ministry showed drastic increases in maternal and infant mortality as well
as significant rises in cases of various illnesses. The health minister that published the report was
dismissed in the days following the publication, highlighting the corruption and unchecked
power of the administration (Gupta, 2017).
The status of health within the country has implications far beyond Venezuela – the mass
exodus of Venezuelans in recent years makes the public health in the country of even greater
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importance. With sharply declining vaccination coverage, it is likely that many Venezuelan
migrants are arriving at their host countries susceptible to, and possibly carriers of, various
vaccine-preventable diseases. The health problems that plague the Venezuelan population do not
cease to exist once a border is crossed – Venezuelans carry the weight of a failing health care
system into their receiving communities.
Measles & the Americas
The measles virus has seen a marked revival since the onset of the Venezuelan crisis.
Prior to immunization campaigns and efforts at eradication, measles was known as a common
childhood illness (Mina et al., 2019). In the 1960s, 600,000 cases of measles were reported
annually in the Americas. Case numbers only began to decrease in 1977, after the introduction of
the World Health Organization Expanded Program on Immunization (Leite & Berezin, 2015).
The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) was finally able to declare the region of the
Americas free of measles in 2016, a major accomplishment for the public health of the region
(PAHO/WHO, 2016). This success was short-lived, however, as measles returned to the region
in 2017 via large outbreaks in Venezuela that spread across borders. In total, 16,822 cases of
measles were reported in the Americas in 2018; 19,530 were reported in 2019. The PAHO has
since undertaken efforts to control the measles outbreak in Venezuela, focusing on a nation-wide
vaccination campaign that successfully provided measles vaccination to over 8.8 million
children. While this will be effective in preventing more outbreaks in the short-term, it is
essential that vaccination coverage remains above 95% in order to avoid future outbreaks
(PAHO, 2020). Countries in Latin America should be prepared for the possibility that measles
returns once again to Venezuela and have effective strategies to combat large-scale spread
similar to what occurred in 2018.
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Measles Pathology & Epidemiology
Measles is one of the most contagious known infectious diseases. Its R0, or the expected
number of secondary cases resulting from a single case of a disease, ranges from 12-18 (Laksono
et al., 2016). The pure transmissibility of the measles virus is enough to justify its public health
importance; its pathogenesis and long-term effects only solidify its significance.
The prodromal stage of measles is marked by the 3 C’s: cough, coryza, and
conjunctivitis. Koplik’s spots in the mouth follow, along with the development of a
maculopapular skin rash that eventually envelops the entire body. Recovery provides lifelong
immunity to measles, but also a transient immunosuppression that may last over 2 years – a high
price to pay for protection from a disease that could be successfully gained through vaccination.
Not all patients recover, as a number of complications could arise. These range from respiratory
infections like pneumonia, to more severe central nervous system infections like encephalitis
(Laksono et al., 2016).
The lasting immunosuppression following infection with the measles virus is a relatively
recent finding. It highlights the importance of understanding the full scope of consequences that
could result from an infectious disease outbreak beyond case numbers and mortality rates. In the
pre-vaccine era, it is estimated that measles virus infections could have been associated with up
to 50% of all childhood infectious disease deaths, either directly or indirectly. The mechanism
for this has been termed “immune amnesia” – the measles virus is associated with reductions in
antibody diversity, as well as reductions in the magnitude of antibody binding signals, essentially
destroying built up immunity to various pathogens (Mina et al., 2019). Ultimately, this means
that the measles vaccine provides a degree of herd immunity to non-measles infections (Mina et
al., 2015). The World Health Organization reported that between 2000 and 2017, measles virus
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vaccinations prevented over 21 million deaths without accounting for this phenomenon; the
actual number of deaths prevented through vaccination are likely much higher (Mina et al.,
2019).
Framework
The control and eventual eradication of the measles virus could have a multiplied positive
impact on society as a whole. The burden which it places on the functioning of the communities
it affects, as well as the health care systems within said communities, is almost unmeasurable.
There are various avenues to investigate when determining factors relevant to measles control in
Colombia and Brazil. This section sets up the theoretical framework that guides this study. It
focuses on the interconnectedness of vaccination coverage, migrant integration, and migration
policy in determining disease control capabilities in the case of large-scale migration.
Vaccination Coverage
The importance of the measles-containing vaccine (MCV) cannot be overstated in the
discussion of measles control. The measles vaccine is safe and highly effective at preventing
infection with the measles virus, but an overall MCV coverage rate of 95% is necessary to
establish and maintain herd immunity (PAHO, 2020). Vaccination coverage is dependent upon a
multitude of factors that can be synthesized into three categories: intent to vaccinate, health
facility readiness, and community access. These factors were laid out in a frequently cited
systematic review investigating the determinants of vaccine coverage in low and middle-income
countries (Phillips et al., 2017).
The contributing factors for intent to vaccinate were identified by Phillips et al. (2017)
from the Theory of Planned Behavior, a highly regarded and long-standing behavioral model.
These factors include attitude toward the behavior, subjective norm, and perceived behavioral
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control, each of which can be directly associated with vaccine hesitancy and anti-vaccination
movements (Ajzen, 1991; Phillips et al., 2017). Vaccine hesitancy is not a novel concept: since
the inception of vaccination, people have held sentiments of distrust and skepticism. Generally,
reasons for vaccine hesitancy stem from uncertainty and lack of confidence, not from analysis of
empirical evidence (Brown et al., 2018; Guzman-Holst et al., 2020; Sato, 2018). By applying the
aforementioned behavioral model, certain questions are raised in the discussion of the source or
causes of vaccine hesitancy within a community: Is the importance of vaccination promoted by
health care professionals within communities? Are the positive impacts of vaccination made
clear so that vaccine hesitancy does not become the perceived norm? Do health care providers
prioritize thorough communication in order to provide parents with a sense of agency over their
children’s well-being? Answering each of these questions can provide insight into gaps in
vaccination coverage that exist within a country or region (Phillips et al., 2017).
Nonetheless, if vaccines aren’t made available, intent to vaccinate holds little importance.
This highlights the relevance of the remaining two factors outlined in Phillips’s study: health
facility readiness and community access. Health facility readiness refers more specifically to the
physical availability of vaccines and the necessary supplies needed for their administration. It is
based on the WHO Health Systems Building Blocks framework, which describes health systems
as set of 6 components: service delivery, health workforce, health information systems, access to
essential medicines, financing, and leadership/governance (WHO, 2010).
Community access refers to the barriers that may or may not be in place that hamper the
connection between intent and readiness (Phillips et al., 2017). There are many barriers to
vaccination; among those most commonly cited as reasons for delayed or missed vaccinations
are living in rural areas far from a health facility, having a large family or a large number of
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children in a household, and having a forgetful caregiver. Among factors found to favor vaccine
uptake were higher socioeconomic status and steady employment (Guzman-Holst et al., 2020).
Thus, increasing vaccine accessibility does not simply imply increasing the number of
vaccinations available, but removing or mitigating the effects of certain circumstances leading to
lower demand for a vaccine. An additional impediment to effective vaccination coverage is the
existence of an under-skilled health care workforce (Tapia-Conyer et al., 2013). While vaccines
may be available, without proper promotion and administration on behalf of health care
professionals they remain inaccessible. These findings highlight the multi-sided nature of the
vaccine accessibility dilemma; all of the blame cannot be placed on a single actor, nor can a
single policy or infrastructure change eliminate all barriers in place.
The next major factor relevant to measles control through vaccination coverage is
surveillance capabilities within and between countries. Not only does proper surveillance of
disease and vaccination rates provide valuable data for the tracking of epidemics, but it also
allows monitoring of high-risk groups and areas that need targeted reform, facilitates estimation
of the burden of vaccine preventable diseases, and expedites the evaluation of the effectiveness
of previous reforms (Tapia-Conyer et al., 2013). Hence, high quality and reliable surveillance
capabilities are vital in isolating areas with suboptimal vaccination coverage or high disease rates
and informing future efforts for disease control and vaccine distribution.
The final factor to consider is heterogeneity of vaccinated and unvaccinated populations,
or the spatial distribution of vaccinated individuals. An overall vaccination rate of 95% is
necessary to protect a population from a measles outbreak. However, when there are localized
pockets of under immunization despite an overall coverage of 95%, the measles virus is given
the opportunity to proliferate. Areas with localized low vaccine coverage have been found to
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become hotbeds for infection with more extreme outbreaks and a lower average age of infection
(Doocy et al., 2019). These pockets of under immunization can come into existence via a
multitude of mechanisms; for example, anti-vaccination movements may cause geographic
clusters of parents to refuse vaccination for their children. Additionally, the previously discussed
barriers to vaccination may isolate certain populations: those of lower socioeconomic status,
those living in rural areas, or those who are unemployed could tend to aggregate in certain
neighborhoods or localities.
Migrant Integration
The effects of localized pockets of under-vaccination calls attention to the importance of
the dispersal and integration of Venezuelan migrants throughout their host populations.
Xenophobic sentiments often prevent integration within host countries by promoting exclusion
and discrimination against immigrant populations. At an individual level, experiences of
xenophobic sentiments have been found to be associated with difficulties integrating into the
host community and social stress. At the community level, it has been found to promote violence
and serve as a barrier to health care access (Suleman et al., 2018).
A study conducted by Bosetti, et al. (2020) investigating measles outbreaks that occurred
in Turkey as a result of a massive influx of Syrian refugees concluded that maximal dispersal of
unvaccinated refugees into the vaccinated Turkish population served to impede, rather than
favor, the spread of measles. This finding supports existing evidence on vaccine heterogeneity.
Essentially, with sufficient levels of mixing, the vaccinated host population shields the
unvaccinated migrant population from exposure to infection. This simultaneously reduces
sources of infection, preventing a full-blown outbreak from ever beginning (Bosetti et al., 2020).
Some comparisons can be drawn between Syrian refugees in Turkey and Venezuelan migrants in
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Colombia and Brazil. Both Syrian refugees and Venezuelan migrants are likely to arrive in their
recipient countries in poor health, having had little access to medical care in their home
countries. This makes them less likely to be vaccinated, and more likely to be carrying infectious
diseases. Moreover, because both Syrians and Venezuelans are mass-emigrating due to crises
and collapses in their own home countries, the countries they flee to are under great pressure and
strain to accommodate the large influx of people.
Migration Policy
As neighboring countries to a country in crisis, the governments of Colombia and Brazil
have many key responsibilities. There are a number of measures governments can take to prevent
infectious disease outbreaks in response to a large influx of migrants that come from countries
with failing health care systems. A study conducted by Gastañaduy, et al. (2018) identifies
strategies and challenges for maintenance of measles control in elimination settings. The study
highlights the importance of designating a committee tasked with responding to outbreaks,
isolation of infectious cases, vaccination of non-immune individuals, and maintaining laboratory
capabilities for confirmation of measles cases (Gastañaduy et al., 2018). Under this framework of
proven strategies, the responses of Colombian and Brazilian governments can be compared in
order to pinpoint shortcomings.
Before an outbreak ever occurs, National Immunization Programs (NIPs) should be
working to provide vaccinations to their population, targeting those who are most vulnerable.
With an effective NIP, a country should be relatively prepared for the introduction of infectious
disease before a single case is ever identified. By targeting populations that are more difficult to
reach, inequalities can be reduced and potential for disease proliferation can be mitigated. For
this task, quality government surveillance programs are critical (Andrus, 2020).
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Chapter Three: Qualitative Analysis
This chapter focuses on the qualitative analysis of factors related to the measles outbreaks
in each country, concentrating on the borders, migration policies, and health systems. It
concludes with analysis of the progression of the measles outbreaks as well as an investigation
into the age makeup of the Venezuelan population in each country.
The Borders
The borders Venezuela shares with Colombia and Brazil are of great relevance to this
discussion. Why and how Venezuelans are crossing, what conditions they find upon entry into
the recipient country, and what that country is doing (or not doing) to facilitate their integration
can have an immense impact on the importation of disease. This section explores the context of
each border zone, highlighting important points of contrast between Colombia and Brazil.
Historical Trends
The roughly 1,400-mile-long border between Colombia and Venezuela has often seen
great activity. Between the two countries, political, economic and social crises, along with
differences in living conditions and opportunities, have at times driven Colombians and
Venezuelans in one direction or the other. In recent years, the movement has favored the
direction of Colombia. Venezuelans, fleeing political unrest and economic uncertainty, have
been traveling in large numbers across the border in hopes of finding greater stability and
improved livelihoods.
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Despite recent trends, migratory movement has not always favored Colombia. Between
1970 and 2014, during the period of internal armed conflict between the Colombian government
and various paramilitary and guerilla groups, large numbers of Colombians – an estimated 1.5
million – emigrated to Venezuela, a country that at the time offered relative stability and
economic opportunity (Durán & Cuevas, 2020). The migratory trends changed direction as
conditions in Venezuela fell deeper into crisis. In 2015, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro
deported around 17,000 Colombians residing illegally in Venezuela along with 22,000
Colombians who “voluntarily” returned following pressure from the Venezuelan government. At
the same time, Venezuelans began to flee their own country in search of better opportunities in
Colombia (Castillo et al., 2018; Durán & Cuevas, 2020).
The border between Brazil and Venezuela holds less historical and geopolitical relevance
in terms of migration. The border between the two countries is around 1,366 miles long, but
much of the borderland is covered in dense wilderness areas that are inaccessible. Moreover, the
migratory and economic ties between the countries may be better described as links between the
state of Roraima and Venezuela rather than between Brazil and Venezuela. Because Roraima is
geographically closer to urban centers in Venezuela than to its own nation’s capital, extensive
economic and political ties link them together. Roraima is even connected to the electricity grid
of Venezuela (Ebus, 2019).
The differences between Colombia and Brazil in past migratory trends helps
contextualize some of the problems that exist at the borders. Colombians and Venezuelans share
a somewhat more intimate migratory relationship, as Venezuela offered stability and opportunity
during tumultuous periods of Colombian history. In contrast, the border between Brazil and
Venezuela did not experience similar migratory patterns prior to the Venezuelan crisis.
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Furthermore, Venezuela is more closely associated with the state of Roraima than it is to Brazil
as a whole. The next sub-section details the manners in which Venezuelans cross the borders into
each country and further investigates the conditions they find upon entry.
Points of Entry & Xenophobia in Colombia
Colombia and Brazil are remarkably different in the presence and distribution of formal
entry points along their borders with Venezuela. Seven of Colombia’s 32 departments, share a
border with Venezuela: La Guajira, César, Norte de Santander, Boyacá, Arauca, Vichada, and
Guainía. Prior to 2016, there were five formal entry points distributed among these departments.
However, after the closing and then re-opening of the border by the Venezuelan government,
Colombia opened two additional entry points in Norte de Santander in response to the high
migration flow, increasing the number of formal entry points along the border to seven.
Not all migrants cross through formal entry points, however. Illegal trails between
Colombia and Venezuela, called trochas facilitate the clandestine crossing of people and goods
(Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2019). These border zones are far from peaceful – many areas are
occupied by various criminal groups seeking to profit from the use of informal border crossing
points (Crisis Group Latin America, 2020). Guides along the trails, called trocheros collect fees
from Venezuelans seeking to cross the border, and frequent conflicts between criminal groups as
well as between criminal groups and security forces often result in violence (Crisis Group Latin
America, 2020; Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2019). In late September of 2018, Colombia’s
migration authority estimated that there were around 80,000 Venezuelan migrants living in the
country that entered through unauthorized border points (Migración Colombia, 2018c).
Large-scale migration from Venezuela has certainly caused changes within Colombia and
its municipalities. Economically speaking, Venezuelan migration has been correlated with some
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negative effects on Colombia as a whole. The World Bank reports that every 1% increase in
immigration rate corresponds with a 2% increase in poverty rate and a 3% increase in
unemployment rate. However, because the majority of Venezuelans view Colombia as a longterm place of residence and are educated to an equal or greater level as Colombians, it is possible
that they will begin integrating into the formal, skilled labor market to a greater degree and
contributing to the economy of Colombia in a positive manner (World Bank, 2018).
In terms of discrimination and xenophobia, there have been shifting dynamics in how the
Colombian population generally views Venezuelan migrants. From the early 2000’s to 2010,
Venezuelan migratory movement was characterized by the entrance of Venezuelan businesses
and the entrance of professionals, which led to public perception of Venezuelan migrants being
generally favorable. The entrance of Venezuelan companies and skilled workers aided the
economy and created more opportunities for Colombians (Castillo et al., 2018).
As Venezuela slipped further into crisis, however, perceptions began to change. With the
2015 expulsion of thousands of Colombian nationals residing in Venezuela and the beginning of
a migrant crisis, perceptions of Venezuelan migration took a turn for the worse. News and media
coverage depicted Venezuela in a more negative light, fueling sentiments that the entrance
Venezuelans (and even the re-entrance of Colombians from Venezuela) contributed to crime and
illicit activity, posing a threat to public safety. However, as the crisis in Venezuela worsened,
some news coverage and public addresses came to embody a more humanitarian perspective.
Venezuelans came to be seen, in general, as victims in vulnerable situations and in need of
assistance rather than criminals (Castillo et al., 2018).
The presence of anti-Venezuelan sentiments varies in Colombia. The historical ties
between Venezuela and Colombia has created a fairly welcoming and hospitable environment for
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some Venezuelans, as evidenced by the street sign hanging near the border crossing point
between Villa de Rosario (near Cúcuta in the department of Norte de Santander, Colombia) and
San Antonio del Táchira in Venezuela that reads (in Spanish) “Colombia and Venezuela united
forever: Welcome to COLOMBIA” (Proyecto Migración Colombia, 2018). However, in border
areas with greater presence of criminal groups there have been some instances of xenophobia and
discrimination against Venezuelans. Pamphlets threatening the Venezuelan population have
circulated through some municipalities, notably Cúcuta, Arauca and Subachoque. In addition,
there have been reports of targeted killings of Venezuelans in shelters in Cúcuta and Arauca.
Many of the negative views toward Venezuelans tend to stem from the expulsion of Colombians
in Venezuela in 2015 and the perceived impacts they have had on the economy and personal
security. In reality, however, criminal statistics suggest that Venezuelans commit crimes and are
victims of crimes at the same rate and frequency as their Colombian counterparts (World Bank,
2018). Thus, the feelings of insecurity are not supported statistically and are more often a result
of prejudice and fear.
Points of Entry & Xenophobia in Brazil
Brazil’s border entry situation can be drawn in sharp contrast to Colombia’s. Of the 26
states in Brazil, only two share a border with Venezuela – Roraima and Amazonas. Much of the
border region is impassable by land, and there is only one main formal entry point into the city of
Pacaraima, located in the state of Roraima. Brazilian government estimates suggest that around
50% of the migrants who enter Brazil remain in Roraima, while 19% settle in the neighboring
state of Amazonas (Shamsuddin et al., 2021). Although Brazil did initiate interiorization efforts
to spread out the migrant population (as will be further discussed later in this chapter), more
Venezuelans arrive than the amount able to be transferred to alternative destinations, and some
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prefer to remain in the northern region so that they have the option to eventually return home or
visit family members (Ebus, 2019).
Informal crossing points along the border operate similarly to those located along the
Colombian border, and pose similar dangers. Criminal groups, along with Venezuelan
government guardsmen, charge fees to Venezuelans seeking to use unauthorized trails to cross
the border. They also participate in the smuggling of goods, as well as human trafficking (Ebus,
2019).
Along with having only one main entry point for a massive flow of people entering the
country, Brazil’s northern region has historically been the poorest, least populous and worst-off
in terms of resource availability. In 2016, the northern region of Brazil contributed only 4.7% to
the Brazilian GDP. The state of Roraima, where most Venezuelan migrants enter and remain,
contributed only 0.2% to Brazilian GDP in 2016 and has one of the lowest state populations in
the country at around 500,000 (Shamsuddin et al., 2021). Public service quality in the state of
Roraima, as well as the northern region as a whole, is generally poor. It is difficult for those in
the northern region to travel to more populated areas of the country due to long distances and
transport options that are limited and come with high costs (Silva & Jubilut, 2018).
The pressure being put on the poor and isolated state of Roraima to facilitate the entry of
Venezuelan migrants has led to Venezuelan migrants being blamed for the collapse of public
services by state and local authorities throughout the region. This has led to both xenophobic
actions and sentiments within the population, as well as attempts to prevent Venezuelan migrants
from entering the country.
In August 2018, attacks on squatter camps and shelters in Pacaraima caused 1,200
Venezuelans to flee back into the country that they had just recently managed to escape. The
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attack was prompted by a report made by a local Brazilian business owner claiming assault by a
group of Venezuelans. The demonstration began to draw attention to the strain the migration
crisis had put on the city, blaming government officials for failing to control the situation, but
quickly devolved into “intense violence and xenophobia” (Andreoni, 2018). These xenophobic
attacks are not isolated to the border town of Pacaraima. In February 2018, a shelter housing
Venezuelan migrants in the capital city of Boa Vista was covered in gasoline and set on fire. In
September, an incendiary device was thrown into another shelter in the city (Conectas Human
Rights, 2018).
The blaming of Venezuelan migrants for the collapse of public services was exemplified
in July of 2018 when the governor of Roraima, Suely Campos, attempted to close the border
entry point with Venezuela (Armendáriz, 2018). She called for the border closure claiming that
migration from Venezuela had put too much pressure on the health system within the state and
contributed to increased crime. She later reported to Brazilian media that the president of Brazil,
Michel Temer, had not provided sufficient aid to the state to help them with the humanitarian
crisis (AP News, 2018). Campos only succeeded in closing the border for a few hours before the
order was overturned by the Supreme Court (BBC News, 2018). While the effort to prevent the
entry of migrants was ultimately unsuccessful, it brings to light the dire nature of the situation, as
well as the desperation of government officials in the state. The state of Roraima was simply
unequipped to handle migration flow at such a great magnitude, and the federal government was
failing to provide the resources that were urgently needed.
Conclusions: The Borders
Two major points to consider in the discussion of the Venezuelan border zones in
Colombia and Brazil are differences in historical relations and geography. Colombia and
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Venezuela share a history of major migration movements between the countries. Brazil and
Venezuela do not share the same historical ties.
Additionally, Colombia’s border with Venezuela spans across many different states,
spreading the impact of migration flows among different state and local governments. This also
makes the impact of the migratory crisis more visible. In Brazil, Venezuelans enter into one of
the poorest and least-connected states in the entire country, which could be an explanatory factor
for delayed response times and lower prioritization of the migratory crisis by the Brazilian
federal government. Additionally, much of Brazil’s population outside of the northern region
might not be quite as aware of or affected by the situation, giving the federal government even
more leniency–in terms of political repercussions–in its handling of the crisis along the border.
Migration Policy
This section details migration policies and domestic government responses to the
Venezuelan crisis in Colombia and Brazil. First is a discussion of the regularization pathways
available to migrants seeking to enter each country. A timeline of government responses to the
migratory crisis follows.
Pathways available to Venezuelan migrants seeking to enter Colombia or Brazil
In response to the Venezuelan crisis, many countries in Latin America have altered or
created legal pathways to facilitate the entrance and integration of Venezuelan migrants.
Colombia and Brazil are similar in that neither requires a visa for entry for those of Venezuelan
nationality. However, they differ in that Colombia requires a passport, while Brazil does not.
This can be a barrier to regular entry for Venezuelans as it is difficult to obtain and renew
passports in Venezuela due to a combination of cost, government inefficiency and retaliation by
the government against the opposition (Selee et al., 2019). However, Colombia does have two
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options available for Venezuelans without a passport: they may obtain a Border Mobility Card
(Tarjeta de Movilidad Fronteriza or TMF) or a transit permit. The TMF was created in 2016 as a
response to increased flow of migrants across the Colombian-Venezuelan border after its
reopening by the Venezuelan government after 8 months of closure on August 13, 2016
(Migración Colombia, 2018b). It allows Venezuelans with a national identity document and
proof of residence in Venezuela the opportunity to cross the border freely while maintaining
permanent residence in Venezuela. The transit permit is valid for 15 days and allows migrants to
legally pass through Colombia on their way to a different country of destination without
providing a passport (Migración Colombia, 2018c). Both of these options allow for the regular
crossing of persons who may have otherwise resorted to the use of illegal and dangerous
measures to enter the country without a passport.
For those who wish to gain regular status in Colombia, the government created the
Special Stay Permit (Permiso Especial de Permanencia, or PEP) in August of 2017. This permit
is available to only Venezuelan migrants, is free, and provides two years of work authorization,
and access to public services like health care, education, and childcare (Migración Colombia,
2018b). The PEP is offered in phases and each is slightly different. The first phase of the permit
was available to those who entered the country with a passport before July 28, 2017. The second
phase was available to those who entered regularly before February 2, 2018, as well as those who
entered irregularly but registered with the government through the Administrative Registry of
Venezuelan Migrants (Registro Administrativo de Migrantes Venezolanos, or RAMV) in the
Spring of 2018 (Selee et al., 2019). A third and fourth phase of PEP were also created and
instituted. As of December 2018, an estimated 453,000 Venezuelans held this status, which was
around 40% of the Venezuelan population in the country at the time. In February of 2021 the

25

Colombian government went even further in its attempts to regularize the status of its
Venezuelan migrant population by granting temporary protection status to all Venezuelan
migrants in the country (GIFMM & R4V, 2021). While this is outside the scope of this project
and would not have contributed to the control of measles outbreaks in 2018 and 2019, it is an
example of the magnitude of the efforts being made on behalf of the Colombian government to
mitigate issues that have arisen as a result of the Venezuelan crisis and ensure that the
Venezuelan population has access to the means required to improve their situations.
Venezuelan migrants seeking to obtain regular status in Brazil may apply for a temporary
residence permit, which is valid for two years. This pathway was made available in March of
2017. During the first few months in which these permits were available, they were not widely
utilized. However, once the fee was waived, the number of applications began to rise. In
December of 2018, 23,000 permits had been issued (Selee et al., 2019).
The final pathway to consider for both countries is the process of obtaining refugee
status. Despite Colombia receiving 10 times more Venezuelan migrants than Brazil, Brazil
received 56,000 asylum applications by December of 2018, while Colombia received only 1,600.
This may be the result of Colombia having migration processes available that provided better
benefits and could be obtained more quickly than refugee status, which would often take up to
two years to process. Those who applied for asylum in Brazil are granted access to health care,
education, and work permits while their cases are pending, but there was extreme backlog in the
asylum system as well as delays in granting documents that would allow access to services. As a
way to combat the accumulation of asylum claims in processing, Brazil announced in December
of 2018 that those who had a pending asylum application and a job in the formal labor market
before November 21, 2017 could apply for the two-year temporary residence visa, which would

26

withdraw their asylum application (Selee et al., 2019). In December of 2019, the Brazilian
government went a step further in its decision to accelerate the processing of asylum claims by
simplifying the steps and requirements, which led to the granting of refugee status to around
21,000 Venezuelans during the month (ACSG/UNHCR, 2019).
In comparing the migration pathways available in each country, a few differences can be
highlighted. First is the speed of response by each government. The first legal pathway created
by Colombia in response to the Venezuelan crisis was implemented in August of 2016 compared
to Brazil’s first response in March of 2017. Additionally, Colombia’s creation of many phases of
PEP may show that the Colombian government was somewhat more proactive and determined to
handle the crisis in a way that would benefit both the Venezuelan migrant population and the
host communities. In contrast, Brazil had fewer responses, implementing one new pathway in
March of 2017 (that initially came with a cost that was too high for most Venezuelans to pay)
and then only later responding to backlog in asylum claims within the bureaucracy. Brazil is
more lenient in terms of passport requirements, but the pathways available for those who entered
the country legally often take longer to obtain. In addition, those who enter without
documentation are not readily offered pathways for regularization in Brazil, while there are
regularization options in Colombia.
Responses to the Venezuelan crisis
While providing Venezuelan migrants with access to social services and work permits is
certainly important, ensuring that these benefits are actually able to be utilized by the migrant
population is also necessary. The governments of both Colombia and Brazil created programs
and entities aimed at resolving some of the strain brought about by the Venezuelan migratory
crisis.
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In January of 2017, the Colombian government, in conjunction with the CDC, began
developing a public health emergency operations center (Centro de Operaciones de Emergencia
en Salud Pública, or COE-ESP) (CDC, 2021). Having this public health response structure
established allowed measures to be taken immediately upon the identification of the first measles
case within the country. Among the measures implemented by districts that reported measles
cases were contact tracing, transmission chain mapping, and surveillance in health care facilities.
They also began vaccination campaigns in at-risk areas, including the border zone (Schluter &
Knight, 2019).
In addition to the use of the COE-ESP in response to Venezuelan migration, Colombia
also reacted to the crisis by creating the Special Migration Group (Grupo Especial Migratório, or
GEM) in 2018. This group aims to implement measures to control irregular migration, guarantee
the protection of the rights of children, provide security, and fight against smuggling (Migración
Colombia, 2018a). An additional effort implemented by Colombia was the creation of the
Administrative Registry of Venezuelan Migrants (Registro Administrativo de Migrantes
Venezolanos, or RAMV) also in 2018. The RAMV was a system designed to collect data on the
sociodemographic characteristics of the Venezuelan population in Colombia in order to analyze
and direct policy responses (Migración Colombia, 2018c).
In Brazil, the largest and most overarching program initiated to help Venezuelan migrants
entering the country was termed Operation Welcome, or Operação Acolhida. This program has
three main purposes: to manage the border and documentation, to provide humanitarian service,
and to facilitate voluntary relocation throughout the country (Shamsuddin et al., 2021). The
program was created in March 2018 and was able to relocate an estimated 10,000 Venezuelan
migrants to shelters or relatives’ homes throughout the country by September of 2019 (HRW,
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2019). Basic health care services were also provided by Operation Welcome. In a collaboration
between the Brazilian government and many nongovernmental organizations, teams of health
professionals were deployed in Bôa Vista to provide care in shelters. Additionally, six doctors
were sent to Pacaraima in order to screen and vaccinate at the border crossing point (Doocy et
al., 2019).
Conclusions: Migration Policy
The most notable difference in the responses to the Venezuelan crisis by Colombia and
Brazil is not necessarily what policies and programs were implemented, but how they were
executed. Both countries established task forces with similar goals, but Colombia did so by
designating different groups with specific purposes rather than establishing a single group with a
multitude of various purposes. By doing this, the COE-ESP could focus on public health
responses, the GEM could focus on migration and security responses, and the RAMV could
focus on data collection and registration. In contrast, Brazil used Operation Welcome for all of
these purposes, which may have led to diminished returns. A similar trend can be observed in
migration pathways available to Venezuelan migrants seeking to cross each border. Colombia
implemented policies specifically for the Venezuelan migrant population, while Brazil altered
existing pathways.
Ultimately, both Colombia and Brazil attempted to alleviate strain resulting from the
Venezuelan crisis through the creation or alteration of migration pathways and designation of
task forces to respond to crises at the border. However, Brazils efforts tended to be highly
reactive to problems that already existed, while Colombia’s efforts showed greater proactivity.
The evidence presented in this section is not enough to identify migration policy and response as
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the sole reason for differential impact of measles importation, but does provide justification for
the consideration of these topics as possible contributing factors.
Health Systems
This section analyzes the health care systems of Colombia and Brazil through comparison
of the structure and history of each system, along with their respective national immunization
programs (NIPs). It aims to bring forward important distinctions that may have contributed to the
ability of each country to control measles importation.
Health System Structure and History: Colombia
Colombia’s health care system is organized by the General System of Social Security in
Health (Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud, or SGSSS), which is split into two
different insurance schemes: the contributory scheme for those employed in the formal sector
and able to pay, and the subsidized scheme for those unable to pay (Garcia-Subirats et al., 2014).
Access to health care for Venezuelans in Colombia is determined by immigration status.
Emergency care and public health interventions were made available at no cost to Venezuelans
in May of 2017 (Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2018; Doocy et al., 2019; Torres, 2019).
This includes treatment for diseases (like measles), complete health coverage for pregnant
women, and free vaccinations for children (Torres, 2019; Doocy et al., 2019). Between August
of 2017 and August of 2018, 515,622 doses of vaccinations on the national vaccination schedule
were given to Venezuelan migrants with 83% of the doses given to children under 5 years of age
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2018). In order to receive non-urgent health care,
Venezuelan migrants have to enroll in insurance through the SGSSS, which requires a regular
immigration status, or pay out of pocket.
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The Colombian Ministry of Health reported that between 2017 and 2018, health care
provision to the Venezuelan migrant population country-wide increased by 202.6%
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2018). Erasmo Meoz University Hospital in Cúcuta,
Norte de Santander received the most Venezuelan patients in 2018 and saw a 248% increase in
the number of Venezuelan patients between the first quarter of 2017 and the first quarter of 2018.
Among the Venezuelan patients attended to by public health facilities in Norte de Santander,
40% were children and 7% were infants (Doocy et al., 2019).
The major concern for the Colombian government and health officials at the time was not
necessarily the capacity of the health system to attend to the needs of the Venezuelan population,
but more the sustainability of funding (Doocy et al., 2019; Fernández-Nino & BojorquezChapela, 2018). The cost of attending to Venezuelan patients at just the aforementioned hospital
in Cúcuta amounted to over US$720,000 in 2018 (Doocy et al., 2019). For the vaccinations
given between 2017 and 2018, the cost amounted to over US$1.85 million, not accounting for
the costs accrued by paying medical workers to distribute the doses (Departamento Nacional de
Planeación, 2018). This came at a time when the health care system in Colombia was already
under some financial stress. In June of 2017, Colombian insurance companies owed US$2.5
billion to hospitals and medical facilities across the country (Torres, 2019).
Vaccines in Colombia
Colombia has an extensive national immunization program. The schedule includes 22
vaccines that protect against 26 different diseases. Funding for the program comes from the
Ministry of Health and Social Protection (Ministerio de Salud y Proteción Social, or MSPS),
municipalities, and health promotion entities (Empresas Promotoras de Salud, or EPS), which are
private companies operating under the supervision of the MSPS. Immunization delivery to both
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the insured and uninsured populations is provided at no cost to those receiving the vaccinations.
Municipalities are incentivized to maintain high vaccination rates by receiving a 10% bonus
payment in the public health budget if they reach 95% coverage (Coe & Madan, 2018).
Since the NIP is federally funded, investment in the health system fell during the recent
economic recession, reaching a low of 5.9% of the public budget in 2015. However, as the
economy began to improve, funding rose to 10.9% in 2018. Despite the recession, the
immunization program has been seen as a priority under recent administrations. Since the Uribe
administration from 2002-2010, the national immunization program has been given its own
budget line, which increases its visibility and financial stability. The Santos administration
(2010-18) continued the prioritization of the immunization program by including six new
vaccines in the recommended vaccination schedule (Coe & Madan, 2018).
Figure 2 below shows national vaccination coverage for the first and second doses of the
measles-containing vaccines in Colombia. In 2018, the year of the recent measles outbreak, first
dose coverage was at 95%, the threshold for establishing herd immunity, but second dose
coverage was below this threshold at 88%.
Figure 2

Source: WHO/UNICEF. (2020). Measles vaccination coverage. World Health Organization/United Nations Children’s Fund.
https://immunizationdata.who.int/pages/coverage/mcv.html
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Health System Structure and History: Brazil
Brazil’s 1988 constitution created the Unified Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde,
or SUS) which guarantees universal right to free health care (Columbia Public Health, 2020).
This right is granted to all residents of the country, including those who are foreign-born, and
includes all types of health services – from emergency care to primary care to medications
(Doocy et al., 2019). Those seeking access to health care must obtain a national health card
(Cartão do SUS), which they can do at any hospital, clinic, or health center by providing an
identification card, tax payer’s number and proof of residence (Columbia Public Health, 2020).
While most Venezuelans are eligible for this identification card, they sometimes face barriers
due to discrimination, trouble securing the necessary documents or language barriers (Doocy et
al., 2019). There are some private health care providers and private health insurances in Brazil
that are available at an extra cost and can be used as a supplement to the SUS. The public health
facilities in general offer high quality care, but are often overcrowded and have long wait times.
They also tend to have lower quality conditions (no air conditioning or missing certain types of
equipment) and face organizational challenges with their lack of autonomy, insufficient funding,
and inefficient use of resources (Castro et al., 2019; Columbia Public Health, 2020).
Although the introduction and expansion of a universal health system in Brazil has
improved the health of the country overall since its inception, it is threatened by inadequate
funding and austerity measures meant to limit social spending. Additionally, regional disparities
in the presence and incidence of health problems have lingered (de Souza, 2017). Tracing the
recent economic and political history of Brazil reveals instability that contributes to the cutbacks
on health spending.
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Between 2004 and 2010 the economy of Brazil was doing relatively well. Primary health
care programs and emergency services were expanded under SUS and new oral and mental
health initiatives were enacted. However, around 2011 the economy began to worsen. During
2015 and 2016, a series of policies enacted with the goal of decreasing government spending
undermined the systems in place to guarantee the funding of the SUS and other social programs.
First, amendment 86, enacted in March of 2015, reduced the level of federal funds spent on
health. Then, in September 2016, Congress approved a bill that allowed the government to
override the constitutional rules that set minimums for the amount of spending allocated to areas
like health and education. This bill also extended to states and municipalities. Later, the National
Congress approved amendment 95, which established a ceiling for government spending for the
following 20 years. In effect, this would reduce federal health spending from comprising 1.7% of
GDP in 2016 to comprising an estimated 1.2% of GDP in 2036 (de Souza, 2017). These austerity
measures implemented by the Brazilian government effectively decreased funding for social
programs at the federal level as well as at the state and municipal levels.
The largest public hospital in Roraima, located in Bôa Vista saw a 253% increase in the
number of Venezuelan patients in the first half of 2018 compared to the first half of 2017.
Emergency visits increased by 366%. Researchers found that the hospital was facing many
challenges as a result, including shortages of antibiotics and medical supplies. A smaller hospital
located at the border in the municipality of Pacaraima reported that Venezuelans made up 70%
of their patient base and that they were facing similar shortages at the time of study in August of
2018. The director stated that the severity of the ailments of Venezuelans upon presentation was
contributing to the strain on the health system, causing Venezuelans to have longer
hospitalizations (Doocy et al., 2019).
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Vaccines in Brazil
The national immunization program (NIP) of Brazil is coordinated by the Ministry of
Health in cooperation with health departments of states and municipalities. It has the same basic
goals and principles as the SUS – to provide universal and equitable care to all. Brazil’s NIP
offers 15 vaccines for children, 9 for adolescents, and 5 for adults and the elderly at no cost, and
has made some significant achievements since its creation in 1973. However, the program faces
some major challenges. In 2016, a drop in vaccination coverage rates was observed among
nearly all vaccinations on the national calendar. From 2016-2018, the tuberculosis vaccine
(BCG) was the only vaccine to meet the target coverage rate. The decreased coverage of
measles-containing vaccines can be observed in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3

Source: WHO/UNICEF. (2020). Measles vaccination coverage. World Health Organization/United Nations Children’s Fund.
https://immunizationdata.who.int/pages/coverage/mcv.html

The lowered vaccination rates from 2016 forward can be attributed to drops in federal
funding of the health system, but other factors may have also played a role. First is the increase
of vaccine hesitancy and circulation of misinformation on social media platforms. The Brazilian
Ministry of Health reports that in 2018, 89% of published misinformation relating to health
attacked the credibility of vaccines (Domingues et al., 2020). It is difficult to pinpoint an exact
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reason for the increased spread of anti-vaccination rhetoric. However, a possible explanation
could be a rumor that was spread in northeast Brazil in 2016 claiming that upticks in the number
of babies born with microencephaly was attributable to expired MMR vaccines. Even though the
government and health officials published statements disproving this and citing the Zika virus as
the cause, people’s mistrust of the government led them to believe that vaccines were to blame
(Worth, 2016).
An additional cause for lowered vaccination rates could be the inadequate training of
medical professionals. Domingues et al. (2020) finds that some children are going to health
centers but are not being vaccinated according to national recommendations. This may be a
result of the vaccine calendar becoming more complex and requiring more extensive knowledge
or a result of irregular supply issues due to production problems (Domingues et al., 2020).
While national data is important for understanding overall vaccination coverage,
considering the homogeneity of coverage can help to uncover any geographical gaps in vaccine
protection. A 2020 study investigating the homogeneity of coverage of MCVs in Brazil finds that
the North region of Brazil had the lowest coverage of the first dose of the vaccine in 2017 and
the lowest estimate for homogeneity of coverage (determined by dividing the number of
municipalities that reach the 95% target by the total number of municipalities in the region or
state) (Pacheco et al., 2020). Table 1 below outlines the vaccine coverage and homogeneity
estimates for the North region, as well as for the states of Roraima and Amazonas. The data was
collected in 2017 from the Brazilian National Immunization Program. As the number of entries
of Venezuelan migrants increased drastically between 2017 and 2018 (from ~30,000 to
~120,000), the information presented can be seen as indicative of the situation in which
Venezuelans were entering.
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Table 1
MCV coverage in Roraima, Amazonas & Northern Brazil, 2017
MCV 1st dose
MCV 2nd dose
Homogeneity 1st
dose
North region
80
64.8
46.4
Roraima
89
89.2
40
Amazonas
84.6
65.4
43.5

Homogeneity
2nd dose
23.6
40
6.5

Source: Pacheco, F. C., França, G. V. A., Elidio, G. A., Leal, M. B., de Oliveira, C., & Guilhem, D. B. (2020). Measles-containing
vaccines in Brazil: Coverage, homogeneity of coverage and associations with contextual factors at municipal level. Vaccine,
38(8), 1881–1887.

Conclusion: Comparing Health Systems
In comparing the health systems of Colombia and Brazil, a number of differences can be
noted. First is the overall structure. While Brazil’s system offers universal care at no cost to all,
Colombia has a more pluralistic system that requires individuals to choose their insurance and
service providers and pay according to their income. This differing structure changes the way
Venezuelan migrants are able to access health care in each country. Colombia provides
emergency services and public health interventions to all Venezuelans at no cost, but in order to
receive any other type of care Venezuelans must enroll in an insurance plan or pay out of pocket.
In contrast, Venezuelans in Brazil are able to access the full menu of health care services at no
cost, but must first obtain a national health card.
In terms of immunization programs, both countries offer vaccines at no cost to all
members of the population, regardless of insurance status. Both countries have both doses of the
measles vaccine on their national vaccination calendar. The programs do, however, differ in that
Colombia’s immunization program has its own budget line under the Ministry of Health and
Social Protection, giving it more visibility and designated funding within the budget. Both
immunization programs faced funding issues during economic recessions, but in Colombia,
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funding was restored as GDP grew, while Brazil implemented austerity measures to decrease
social spending, including caps on the health budget.
In looking at measles-containing vaccine coverage in each country, differences can be
seen in the uptake of vaccinations in the years leading up to the 2018 outbreak. While
Colombia’s vaccination rate remained fairly steady, showing slight increase, Brazil’s shows
slight decrease since 2012. Moreover, differences can be seen in homogeneity of coverage.
Figure 4 below shows the percent of districts in each country that reported coverage within each
range in 2018. Colombia’s national MCV1 coverage in 2018 was 95%, and 57% of districts
within the country reported coverage of 95% or greater. In contrast, Brazil’s national coverage
was 92% in 2018, but only 11% of districts reported coverage within the range of 90-94%
(WHO, 2020). This shows greater variation in coverage by district, highlighting a greater range
in coverage rates between districts. Because northern states and municipalities in Brazil tend to
have the lowest rates of coverage, chances of measles outbreaks are even greater within the
region.
Figure 4

Source: WHO. (2020). WHO Vaccine-preventable Diseases: Monitoring System. World Health Organization. Available at
https://apps.who.int/immunization_monitoring/globalsummary

Progression of the Measles Outbreaks
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This section compares the age distribution of the Venezuelan migrant population in
Colombia and Brazil, as well as the course of the measles outbreaks in each country. The age
makeup of Venezuelan populations is important to this study because (1) the measles vaccine is
typically administered during childhood (the first dose is recommended to be given at 12-15
months and the second at 4-6 years of age), and (2) 89% of the measles cases reported in
Venezuela in 2017 were among children under the age of 15 (Gastañaduy et al., 2019;
PAHO/WHO, 2018a). The course of the outbreaks helps to shed light on differences in how each
outbreak progressed that goes deeper than national case numbers.
Age Distribution of Venezuelan Migrants
As many Venezuelan migrants cross the borders into each country without
documentation, it is difficult to capture the true age makeup of the Venezuelan migrant
population. It is for this reason that demographic data is collected from official government
registries as well as surveys conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
The Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), a system created under the IOM, tracks
population mobility in order to collect information on the needs of displaced populations. The
survey conducted by IOM Colombia from October 28th to November 18th of 2019 interviewed
22,430 Venezuelan individuals and included their family members in the survey questions,
allowing for a greater sample size for each measure. The DTM survey in Colombia estimated
that children and adolescents make up around 31% of the migrant population – 14% between the
ages of 0 and 5 years of age, 10% between 6 and 11 years of age, and 7% between 12 and 17
years of age (IOM Colombia, 2020). The official registry kept by Migración Colombia shows
that those ages 0 to 17 made up 17.5% of the population in 2019 (Migración Colombia, 2019).
Thus, the percentage of the population of Venezuelan migrants under the age of 18 in Colombia
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can be estimated to have been somewhere between 17.5% and 31% of the migrant population in
2019.
The DTM survey conducted in Brazil along the same timeframe of that used for Colombia
did not include the ages of family members, so the age makeup of the population is unable to be
gleaned from that particular survey. However, the DTM survey conducted between April 13 and
April 17 of 2019 did include this information. In this survey, 636 individuals were interviewed
and data was collected from 761 of their family members in 14 different municipalities of
Roraima. The DTM found that 53% of Venezuelans in Roraima were under the age of 18 during
the time of this survey (IOM Brazil, 2019). The government entity equivalent to Migración
Colombia in Brazil, OBMigra, estimated that 29% of its Venezuelan migrant population in 2019
was under the age of 18 (OBMigra, 2020). Thus, using these estimates, the percentage of the
Venezuelan population under the age of 18 in Brazil in 2019 can be estimated to have been
between 29% and 53%.
The higher percentage range for Brazil may have implications for measles outbreaks within
the country. With the Venezuelan migrant population in Brazil being slightly younger comes a
greater chance that individuals had not been vaccinated against the measles virus. This could
serve as an additional possible explanation for the differential impact of measles importation.
Even though Brazil received less Venezuelan migrants overall than did Colombia, they could
have received a greater proportion of individuals susceptible to the virus.
Tracing the Outbreaks
The measles outbreaks that occurred across the Region of the Americas were thoroughly
surveilled by the WHO and PAHO. In conjunction, these two organizations provided regular
publications on the situations unfolding in their Epidemiological Update reports. The following
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section contains information gleaned from the reports published between 2018 and 2020 relevant
to outbreaks in Colombia and Brazil (PAHO/WHO, 2018a-g 2019a-f, 2020a-d). These reports
rely on government reporting, which comes with constraints in that the scope and accuracy of the
information provided is limited by the surveillance capabilities of the governments in each
country.
The first measles case in Venezuela was reported in epidemiological week (EW) 26 (midJuly) of 2017. Between EW 26 of 2017 and EW 4 (late January) of 2018, 952 cases of measles
were confirmed. The epicenter of the outbreak was in Caroní, Bolívar state, but cases were
reported in 7 other states and the capital district. Figure 5 below provides an overview of the
progression of the subsequent measles outbreaks in Colombia and Brazil in 2018 and 2019.
Figure 5
The pr ogr ession of the m easles outbr eaks in
Colom bia and Br azil
Br azi l

2018

EW 8 (l at e Feb.)
fir st m easles case r epor ted

Col om bi a

EW 11 (m i d-M ar .)
fir st m easles case r epor ted in
Colom bia

EW 28 (m i d-Ju l y)
677 m easles cases confir m ed,
3,154 suspected

EW 28 (m i d-Ju l y)
40 m easles cases confir m ed in
Colom bia

EW 46 (m i d-Nov.)
9,898 m easles cases confir m ed.
13 deaths

EW 27 (l at e Nov.)
171 m easles cases confir m ed
in Colom bia, 0 deaths

2019
EW 9 (l at e-Feb.)
10,334 m easles cases
confir m ed, 13 deaths

EW 9 (l at e Feb.)
241 m easles cases confir m ed
in Colom bia, 0 deaths

EW 47 (m i d-Nov.)
23,835 m easles cases
confir m ed, 27 deaths*

EW 49 (l at e-Nov.)
438 m easles cases confir m ed, 1
death

* cases r epor ted include those r elated to an outbr eak in São Paulo

Source: PAHO/WHO. (2018a-g) (2019 a-f). Epidemiological Update Measles. Available at http://www.paho.org

The first case identified in Brazil was reported in EW 8 of 2018 in Roraima State. By
April 6th, 316 suspected cases were reported in Brazil – 103 in the state of Amazonas and 213 in
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the state of Roraima. At the time of the report, only 4 cases had been confirmed in Amazonas.
All 4 cases were among Brazilians, one that had been recently vaccinated and 3 not vaccinated.
In Roraima, 42 cases had been confirmed by April 6th, 34 among Venezuelans and 8 among
Brazilians. There were also two reported deaths, both were Venezuelan children.
The first case identified in Colombia was reported in EW 11 of 2018 in a 14-month-old
Venezuelan child in Medellín, Antioquia Department. By April 6th, there were 5 cases reported,
all among children from Venezuela aged 10 months to 2 years. All five children crossed the
border during the communicable period of disease and all were hospitalized. The cases were
reported in 5 different municipalities within 4 different departments.
By mid-July (EW 28) of 2018, 677 measles cases were confirmed among 6 states in
Brazil: Amazonas (444), Roraima (216), Rio Grande do Sul (8), Rio de Janeiro (7), Rondonia
(1), and São Paulo (1). In Roraima, the cases were reported from 11 out of the 15 municipalities
in the state, but the municipalities of Amajarí, Boa Vista and Pacaraima accounted for 94% of
confirmed cases.
By mid-July of 2018, there were 40 confirmed cases in Colombia. Of the 40 confirmed
cases, 23 were known to be directly imported from Venezuela, 16 were import related, and 1 had
an unknown source. The cases were spread throughout 9 departments and 4 districts.
By EW 46 (mid-November) of 2018, Brazil reported 9,898 confirmed measles cases and
13 deaths. At the time of the report, Amazonas had an incidence rate of 2,080.9 cases per
100,000 population among children under the age of 1. The incidence rate for children under the
age of 1 in Roraima was 78.2 cases per 100,000 population.
By EW 47 (late November) of 2018, Colombia had 171 confirmed measles cases and no
deaths among 12 departments and 4 districts. 71% of the total confirmed cases were reported in
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Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Norte de Santander. The country-wide incidence rate for children
under 1 year of age was 5.9 cases per 100,000 population in 2018.
A total of 10,274 confirmed cases were reported in Brazil by EW 2 of 2019 among 11
federal units. All cases, with the exception of one in São Paulo and one in Rio Grande do Sul,
had identical lineage to the virus circulating in Venezuela. Amazonas accounted for 9,778 cases
and 6 deaths, Roraima accounted for 355 cases and 4 deaths. The highest incidence rates per
100,000 population were as follows: >1 years of age 812.1 cases; 1 to 4 years of age 245.7 cases;
5 to 9 years of age 106.9 cases; 10 to 14 years of age 66.6 cases; 15 to 19 years of age 51.0 cases.
Confirmed measles cases in Colombia totaled to 212 in EW 2 of 2019 among 17 federal
units. All cases were reported to have identical lineage to the virus circulating in Venezuela. The
highest incidence rate among Colombians was among those under 1 year of age (6 cases per
100,000 population), followed by those from ages 1-4 (1.7 cases per 100,000 population).
By mid-2019 in Brazil, the number of cases began to subside in the states of Amazonas
and Roraima while simultaneously rising in other states like Pará and São Paulo. These cases had
different viral lineage and resulted from a cruise ship outbreak in São Paulo. The introduction of
additional lineages makes it difficult to discern further information relevant to measles
importation from Venezuela from this point forward.
From the start of the outbreak in 2018 to the end of 2019, Colombia reported a total of
450 cases (208 in 2018 and 242 in 2019) and 1 death. Of the 450 cases, 346 were attributed to 65
different transmission chains. Isolation prevented 104 of the cases from generating any
secondary infection. Genotyping of 119 of the cases revealed all genotype D8; 91 of the cases
had identical lineage to cases from Venezuela, 1 was linked to importation from São Paulo and 1
was linked to importation from Europe. The highest incidence rate in Colombia was among those
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under 1 year of age at 5.0 cases per 100,000 population in 2019. In 2020, only 1 case was
reported.
In the Region of the Americas overall, 12 countries reported measles cases in 2018. The
highest proportion of confirmed cases was reported in Brazil (62%) followed by Venezuela
(34%). In 2019, 85% of the 15,082 confirmed cases reported in the region were from Brazil.
In analyzing the course of the outbreaks in each country, a couple of differences are
highlighted aside from purely numerical dissimilarities. First is the rate at which case numbers
increased. From the first reported case (EW 8 in Brazil and EW 11 in Colombia) to mid-April,
316 cases were reported in Brazil compared to 14 in Colombia. In Colombia, all cases reported
during this time frame were among Venezuelan children, while in Brazil, both Brazilian citizens
and Venezuelans had contracted the virus.
The scope of the information provided also differs between the two countries. The reports
on Colombia often included information on hospitalizations and transmission chains. No such
information was reported on Brazil. As the information published in these reports is largely
obtained through reporting to the PAHO by the governments in each country, the lack of
information reported on the situation in Brazil may indicate lesser disease tracing and isolation
capacity. This cannot be known with certainty, however, as Brazilian government agencies may
have this information and chosen not to report it to the PAHO.
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Chapter Four: Quantitative Analysis
This section quantitatively investigates public opinion toward Venezuelan migrants and
public service access in Colombia and Brazil. The LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey is the
primary data source analyzed. This survey investigates individual opinions and perspectives on a
wide variety of subjects pertaining to political, economic, and social concerns throughout the
Americas. Of particular interest to my study are the questions targeted toward understanding
attitudes toward migrants, immigration policies, and government social assistance. I chose to
analyze survey results from the study in 2018/2019 because it marks the beginning of great
increases in both measles outbreaks and Venezuelan migration within Colombia and Brazil.
Venezuelan migrants and measles cases were not uniformly distributed across each
country during the outbreaks. For this reason, each section will begin by comparing countrywide survey response frequencies to survey responses from areas that reported the greatest
numbers of confirmed measles cases in 2018 (according to epidemiological reporting by the
PAHO). For Colombia, these areas were the districts of Barranquilla and Cartagena and the
department of Norte de Santander. For Brazil, these areas were the states of Roraima and
Amazonas. Analysis in each section will then continue into cross tabulations with responses to
other survey questions, allowing associations between factors to be highlighted.
Attitudes toward Venezuelan Migrants and Migration Policies
The first survey question analyzed is “How much would it bother you to have a
Venezuelan as a neighbor?” Survey respondents were given the choice to select from the
following answer choices: (1) a lot, (2) some, (3) a little, or (4) nothing. As evidenced by Figure
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6 below, the differences between responses in areas most affected by measles outbreaks
compared to the countries as a whole are drastic. Colombian respondents in areas most affected
by measles outbreaks were less likely to find having a Venezuelan neighbor bothersome, while
Brazilian respondents in the most affected areas were less tolerant than the country as a whole.
Figure 6
Attitudes toward Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and Brazil

Sources: LAPOP. (2019a,b). AmericasBarometer 2018/2019: Brazil & Colombia. In Latin America Public Opinion Project.
Available at http://datasets.americasbarometer.org

Running cross tabulations for the responses to this survey question reveals that, in only
Brazil, respondents who receive government assistance are more likely to find it bothersome to
have a Venezuelan neighbor than those who do not [X2 (2, N=32) = 11.266, p = .004]. This could
be a result of use of Venezuelans as scape goats by politicians and government officials, blaming
them for collapse of public services (as was explained in Chapter Three). Because northern
Brazil is already a poor region, many of those living on extremely low incomes may feel that
Venezuelans are causing their already poor situations to become worse.
The LAPOP survey also asked respondents to what extent they agree that the government
of their country should offer social services to Venezuelans who come to live or work in their
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country. Health assistance, education, and housing were given as examples of social services,
and the respondents were asked to choose from the answer choices (1) strongly agree, (2)
somewhat agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) somewhat disagree, and (5) strongly
disagree. As can be seen in Figure 7 below, the median for both datasets (whole country and
filtered) and for both countries is 2, which corresponds to the answer choice “somewhat agree.”
However, the upper and lower quartiles differ between countries and datasets. Utilizing
responses from the entire country reveals that Brazilians are more likely to be in favor of the
government providing social services to Venezuelan migrants than are Colombians. However,
filtering the datasets to include only the areas most affected by measles outbreaks shows that the
relationship inverts – Colombians are more likely to agree that the government should offer
social services to Venezuelan migrants than are Brazilians in the areas most affected by measles
outbreaks.
Figure 7
Attitudes toward access to social services for Venezuelan migrants

Sources: LAPOP. (2019a,b). AmericasBarometer 2018/2019: Brazil & Colombia. In Latin America Public Opinion Project.
Available at http://datasets.americasbarometer.org
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Two possible explanations for this relationship are the differences in health system
structure and the differences in migrant flows between Colombia and Brazil. Brazil provides
universal health care to all, while the Colombian government provides health assistance only to
those who are unable to afford insurance on their own. As a result of these differences, Brazilians
may be more likely to view government provision of health care as normal or expected whereas
Colombians may view it as more of a safety net available as a temporary solution to help citizens
in need. Moreover, as noted previously, Colombia and Brazil are drastically different in terms of
migrant flows. While Colombia has multiple border entry points along its border with
Venezuela, Brazil has only one main crossing point into the state of Roraima in the northern
region. Because the northern region of Brazil has been historically poorer and more resource
depleted than the rest of the country, people living in Roraima and Amazonas may be more
likely to oppose the government extending social services to Venezuelan migrants, as they may
not receive sufficient government assistance themselves.
Attitudes toward Access to Government Provided Public Benefits
Survey respondents were also asked about their perceived access to public benefits
provided by the state. They were given the option to select an answer between 1 (strongly
disagree) and 7 (strongly agree) in order to represent the extent of their agreement with the
statement “You believe you could easily receive the public benefits provided by the state should
you need them.” Colombia’s interquartile range remains the same in both datasets. However, the
median is one point greater in the filtered dataset. This indicates that those living in the areas
with the greatest number of measles cases generally perceive slightly better access to public
benefits. Conversely, Brazil’s median remains the same in both datasets while its upper quartile
value decreases by a half point. This signals that access to public benefits may be perceived as
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slightly worse in the areas most affected by measles outbreaks in Brazil. Additionally, Brazil’s
responses show a larger interquartile range in both cases. These findings highlight how Brazil’s
regional inequality may have impacted the degree to which imported measles cases were able to
spread and proliferate in each country. As a whole, the responses given in Brazil were more
varied than they were in Colombia. Furthermore, the areas that were more impacted by measles
importation and spread in Colombia had relatively greater perceived accessibility of government
benefits compared to the rest of the country, in Brazil, these areas had relatively worse access to
government benefits.
Figure 8
Attitudes toward access to government provided public benefits

Sources: LAPOP. (2019a,b). AmericasBarometer 2018/2019: Brazil & Colombia. In Latin America Public Opinion Project.
Available at http://datasets.americasbarometer.org

Crosstabulation reveals two factors significantly associated with responses to this survey
question for both Colombia and Brazil. First is protection of basic rights. Respondents were
asked to what extent they felt that their basic rights were protected by the political system of
their country by selecting a response between 1 (indicating no protection) and 7 (indicating full
protection). In both countries [Colombia X2 (36, N=99) = 97.986, p=.000] [Brazil X2 (36, N=82)
= 76.257, p=.000] respondents that felt that their basic rights were more protected agreed to a
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greater extent that they would be able to easily receive public benefits if needed. As both of these
questions are different measures that could indicate an individual’s level of trust in their
government, the association between these factors is not unexpected. Political systems that are
more stable allow their populous to feel greater levels security and protection, which leads
respondents to have greater confidence that their government would provide support if they
found themselves in a position of need.
Summary of Findings
Overall, this section of analysis both gives an overview of public opinion and perspective
relating to immigration and government service accessibility as well as highlights how the areas
that were most affected by measles importation may have different views than the population of
the country as a whole. While the areas that experienced the greatest numbers of measles cases in
Colombia tended to be more welcoming toward the Venezuelan population, the opposite was
true of Brazil. Additionally, government benefits were perceived as being more readily available
in the most affected areas of Colombia, but less readily available in the most affected areas in
Brazil.
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Interpretations
This thesis investigates measles outbreaks that occurred in Colombia and Brazil as a
result of disease importation from Venezuela. In comparing these apparently similar situations
that had drastically different outcomes, it is possible to glean some key differences that could
inform not only disease outbreak response following importation, but also proactive capacity
building and prevention measures.
The framework of this thesis laid out three distinct but interconnected topics of relevance
in investigating the measles outbreaks in Colombia and Brazil: vaccination coverage, migrant
integration, and migration policy. Specific findings from each topic are outlined below.
Vaccination Coverage
It goes without stating that vaccination coverage is essential to the control of vaccinepreventable diseases, especially in the case of measles. While at first glance the differences
between MCV-1 coverage in Colombia and Brazil may not seem to be disparate enough to illicit
such divergent outcomes, further investigation reveals key points of contrast that could serve as
explanatory factors. Brazil’s regional disparities in vaccine coverage are a probable contributing
factor to the differential impact of disease importation. The reasons for these disparities, aside
from socioeconomic explanations, can be organized into the previously cited categories: intent to
vaccinate, health facility readiness, and community access. The study demonstrates that lower
coverage of the measles containing vaccines in northern Brazil cannot be attributed entirely to
lack of access – a multitude of explanations ranging from vaccine hesitancy to complacency on
behalf of the public as well as health care providers may also be at play throughout the region.
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Also important in the discussion of vaccination coverage is disease surveillance
capabilities. Colombia’s public health emergency operation center seems to have had a major
impact on their ability to detect, treat and isolate infectious cases, as evidenced by their enhanced
detail in reporting to the PAHO. Having the capacity for these type of in-depth and thorough
responses at a moment’s notice cannot go unrecognized as important to disease control.
Migrant Integration
The level of integration of Venezuelan migrants into their host communities is not only
beneficial for access to social services and opportunities for increased livelihood, but also for the
control of imported infectious disease. Qualitative analysis of the presence of xenophobic
sentiments in Colombia and Brazil yields somewhat similar results. The migratory history
between Colombia and Venezuela does factor into the creation of a welcoming environment in
some ways, but it in no way can be seen as quelling all xenophobic attitudes. However,
quantitative analysis reveals that in the areas in each country most affected by measles outbreaks,
Brazilians are considerably less tolerant of the Venezuelan migrant population. This is another
instance where geographic differences take effect; the disproportionate concentration of
Venezuelan migrants in northern Brazil compared to the more diffuse migrant population in
Colombia is incredibly relevant to this aspect of the discussion. Northern Brazil already had
lower vaccination coverage, so the effects of herd immunity could not be readily gained by
spreading susceptible individuals throughout the population, even if it were possible.
Furthermore, analysis of the age distribution of the Venezuelan population in each
country revealed that Brazil may have received a slightly younger immigrant population, which
may have impacted the rate of importation and proportion of susceptible individuals that entered
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the country. This serves as an additional possible explanation for the greater number of measles
cases reported in Brazil.
Migration Policy
In the case of imported disease, migration policy and government responses are of great
relevance. The proceeding analysis demonstrates that while Colombia and Brazil did both act in
response to the migratory crises at their borders, their methods were not always similar.
Colombia’s efforts were often timelier and more direct, while Brazil’s tended to be more reactive
and less targeted to the specific issues at hand. Additionally, in public health response, the
countries once again took similar approaches, but with different execution. Both attempted to
relieve the strain on the health care systems by providing health services and vaccinations near
border zones. However, Colombia employed the use of their previously established public health
emergency response entity, while Brazil developed a new operation whose response can be seen
as less robust.
Discussion
As a whole, this study finds that while the overarching themes of vaccination coverage,
migrant integration, and migration policy are each probable contributors to the differential
impact of measles importation in Colombia and Brazil, they cannot be considered as separate
from their underlying contexts, nor can one be considered as more impactful than another.
The proceeding analysis does nothing if not highlight the importance of a multifaceted
approach when investigating global health issues resulting from humanitarian crises. Instances of
resurgence of previously controlled or eliminated diseases are almost never a result of a single
flaw in an otherwise unblemished system. The case of resurgence of the measles virus in
Colombia and Brazil as a result of the Venezuelan crisis demonstrates that while maintaining
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vaccination coverage is extremely important in maintaining elimination status, so too is having
the capacity for public health emergency response when crises arise.
Disease resurgence throughout the Americas following the collapse of Venezuela is
evidence that the health of our neighboring nations is as important as the health of our own.
There is no simple way to prevent similar situations from arising. However, by analyzing the
case of measles resurgence in Colombia and Brazil, we are able to learn from their failures and
build on their successes, working toward the development of sustainable and effective strategies
to mitigate the impact of cross-border disease transmission in the future.
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